Claremont Colleges

Scholarship @ Claremont
CMC Senior Theses

CMC Student Scholarship

2012

The Role of the King in the Democratic Transition
in Thailand
Elizabeth A. Van Buskirk
Claremont McKenna College

Recommended Citation
Van Buskirk, Elizabeth A., "The Role of the King in the Democratic Transition in Thailand" (2012). CMC Senior Theses. Paper 476.
http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/476

This Open Access Senior Thesis is brought to you by Scholarship@Claremont. It has been accepted for inclusion in this collection by an authorized
administrator. For more information, please contact scholarship@cuc.claremont.edu.

Claremont McKenna College

The role of the King in the Democratic Transition in Thailand
Submitted to
Professor Minxin Pei
AND
Dean Huang
BY
Elizabeth Van Buskirk

FOR
Senior Thesis
(2011-2012)

Dedicated To:
My Mother, Father and Sister, with all my love.

ACCKNOWLEDGEMENTS
It is my pleasure to thank those who have made this thesis possible, which
includes but its not limited to Professor Pei, The People’s Empowerment Foundation,
Claremont Mckenna College and my family.
First and foremost I would like to thank my reader, Professor Pei. The idea for
this thesis is the result of taking two of his classes; “Democracy in Developing
Countries” and “Chinese Politics.” These were two of the best classes I have ever taken
in my entire academic career. It is due to Professor Pei that I was originally introduced to
the idea of democratic theory, something which has been the focus of my education ever
since. Additionally, Chinese Politics sparked my interest in the Asian region, where
previously I had little experience. After taking these classes with him I knew there is no
better person to have as my reader. It was an honor to work with Professor Pei in writing
this thesis. His advice and guidance made this thesis possible.
Secondly, I would like to thank the People’s Empowerment Foundation. This is
the foundation I worked with over the summer of 2011 when I was in Thailand. They
taught me everything I know about Thailand; their culture, history and current political
situation. They introduced me to a variety of people in Thailand to help shape my
education. In addition, they brought me to remote areas of Thailand so that I could
witness certain political situations first hand. My experience with PEF was a huge
inspiration for this thesis. For that, I will ever be thankful.
Thirdly, I would like to thank Claremont Mckenna College. CMC is known for
their wide array of services. I am lucky to have benefited from many of them, but
especially one in particular. CMC gave me the opportunity to travel and live in Thailand

the summer of 2011. I was the recipient of the McKenna International grant from the
career service office. Without their funding, this experience would have never been
possible.
Lastly, I would like to thank my family. While writing this thesis has been one of
the most rewarding experiences of my academic life, at times the process was arduous
and stressful. I would like to thank my family for all the love, guidance and support they
showed me during this important time in my life.

Table of Contents
1. Introduction…………………………………………………....p. 6
2. Before The Constitution - Kings Rama IV-VII (1850-1932)...p. 15
3. 1973-1976: The Revolution and it’s Aftermath………………p. 38
4. The Coup of 1992 and it’s Aftermath………………………...p. 49
5. Coup of 2006…………………………………………………p. 61
6. Conclusion……………………………………………………p. 73
7. Works Cited…………………………………………………..p. 80

The Role of the King in Democracy in Thailand
I.

INTRODUCTION.
The transition towards democracy in Thailand has been one of the most unique in

the world. It began in 1932 with the overthrow of the absolute Monarchy and the
creation of a constitutional monarchy that eventually evolved into a parliamentary
system. But today the transition remains far from complete. Thailand has created many
democratic practices and institutions, but they are often ineffective and are frequently
subject to undemocratic practices and traditions.
One of the main reasons the transition has been so unique and complicated is the
presence and role of the monarchy itself. Historically, the monarchy in Thailand has
played a large role in every aspect of Thai life - political, social and cultural. The King’s
place in Thai society is a very central one, and one that is deeply imbued with Buddhist
ideology, which is pervasive throughout the culture of Thailand. While there are many
complexities to be explained in regards to the Monarchy’s relationship with the nation of
Thailand, this thesis will examine the role of the current king solely in regards to the
democratic transition.
Theories
There are many theories regarding democratic transitions. In this thesis, I will be
evaluating the traditional role of the institution of the monarchy in democratic transitions
using Samuel P. Huntington’s theory of “transformation” from his books, The Third
Wave and Political Order in Changing Societies.

In The Third Wave, Huntington offers his theory of democratic transition.1 In his
chapter titled “How? Processes of Democratization,” Huntington explains that there are
three types of traditional democratic transitions from authoritarian regimes;
transformations, replacements, and transplacements. A transformation occurs when the
democratic transition is initiated “from above” by those in power. A replacement occurs
when the oppositions overthrow the current government. A transplacement occurs when
there is a compromise between those in the government and the opposition, and both
parties agree to democratize.
“The three crucial interactions in democratization processes were those between
government and opposition, between reformers and standpatters in the governing
collations, and between moderates and extremists in the oppositions.”2 The relative
balance of power between these groups determines the type of transition that takes place.
The type of transition that has been taking place in Thailand is a transformation.
A transformation is when “those in power in the authoritarian regime take the lead and
play the decisive role in ending that regime and changes it into a democratic system.”3
This was the situation in Thailand when the bureaucratic elite made the decision to
democratize, with the forced consent of the King. Huntington states that in a
transformation the balance of power is such that the government is stronger than the
oppositions and thus takes the lead in initiating the transition. In this type of transition,
Huntington highlights the importance of the emergence of reformers in the current
regime, their motives for democratization, their ability to weaken “standpatters,” or hard-
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Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave, (University of Oaklahoma Press, 1991), pp. 122-143
Ibid.
3 Id. p. 124
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liners in the regime, and their ability to placate the opposition. All of these aspects shape
the nature of the transition and determine its outcome.
An important aspect of this type of transition is called “backward legitimacy.”
Backward legitimacy “legitimated the new order because it was product of the old, and it
retrospectively legitimated the older order because it had produced the new.”4 This
practice gives the reformers more control over the democratic transition. This idea is
especially apparent and important in Thailand’s transition. The reformers in the regime
implement the practice of backward legitimacy through the institution of the monarchy.
Huntington offers another theory regarding transitions in his book Political
Change in Traditional Polities.5 This theory more specifically outlines the role and
dilemma of a monarchy in transformations. Huntington explains that modernization
causes changes in society, in that “it creates new social groups and new social and
political consciousness.”6 As a result, new groups of people demand participation in
government. “The participation of these groups in politics seemingly could only come at
the price of the monarchy.”7 The main problem he cites is the inability of a monarchy to
the transfer the traditional source of political legitimacy and authority to democratic
institutions to allow room for these new groups of people. Huntington argues, the more
centralized power and authority is in the institution of the monarchy, the more difficult
the transfer of power will be. This “tension” is especially relevant in the case of
Thailand, and is the main issue the King of Thailand faces in the current democratic
transition.
4
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Combating traditional beliefs
In evaluating the transition in Thailand and comparing it with Huntington’s
theory, I will be challenging some commonly held beliefs about the King’s role in the
democratic process there.
The first is the idea that the since the revolution of 1932, the King is no longer
involved in politics or remains “above politics.” While many people would like to
believe this, I argue that the King has been and is quite active in politics, both directly
and indirectly. Direct intervention by the King will be examined and explained in more
detail in three chapters below describing the events of key periods in Thai history: 197376, 1992, and 2006. These provide specific examples of how the King directly
intervened in governmental affairs, and explain how the people and the government have
perceived his involvement.
The second commonly held belief is that the King is the “protector of democracy”
and that his involvement in the democratic transition is both positive and necessary. This
comes really to the core of my argument. Many people believe that due to the central
role the King plays in Thai society, and previously in Thai politics, the transition to
democracy requires his constant involvement and oversight.. Propping up this belief are
two central ideas: (1) That the King is pro democracy and will support and further
democratic principles and reforms, and (2) that the King, often heralded as the symbolic
“father” of the nation and the source of political and national legitimacy, is appropriately
involved because ultimately he and only he can decide what is best for “his children,”
meaning the people of Thailand. It is often believed that no matter what the

circumstances, the King is always acting in the best interests of the nation because he is
symbolic of national unity.
I contend that while certain historical events could be construed as displaying the
King always in support of democracy, at the heart of those actions was not democratic
progress, but desire for unity and stability in the nation in line with the King’s
“conservative” mentality. I do not contest the importance of the King to the Thai people
and in Thai society, and I agree that up to a point his assistance in the democratic
transition has been helpful. However, I do not believe that he has or will always act in
the best interest of the “people” when it comes to achieving full democratization. At key
points his interests have not lined up with those of democracy for the people. Under
Huntington’s theory of democratic transition, for democracy to truly take hold, the elite
figure that plays a part in bringing about the transition must eventually cede their
traditional source of legitimacy. My thesis is that the King has not done this and actually
has no intention of doing so; and therefore he is not a true supporter of democracy, but
actually an impediment to its full growth.
Method of Advancement
The following describes the process by which I advance my argument and offer
evidence in support. These chapters discuss specific events in Thai history in which the
King intervened directly in Thai politics. While many believes his intervention was “in
the interest” of furthering the democratic transition, I outline these events to emphasize
(1) that the King does in fact intervene in politics and (2) that his continuing actions are
ultimately detrimental to the complete growth of democracy.
Chapter 1:

The first chapter provides a summary of the prominent kings in the Chakri
dynasty (of which the King is the latest successor). I explain the process of
modernization initiated by the these kings, beginning with Rama 4 in 1880 up until Rama
7, the last king before the revolution of 1932. This information is important in order to
understand the reasons behind the decisions to modernize made by the kings, and the
effects these modernizing changes had on the country. It was these reforms that
eventually created the impetus for political change and eventually a call for democratic
reform.
I believe it is important to understand and evaluate the role of the kings in these
historical changes. It highlights the king in Thailand as the historic and traditional person
guiding and initiating all change in society, due to the fact he has been the sole source of
legitimacy. The development of this role of the monarchy highlighted in this history is
important in understanding why the current King assumes the role as the “leader” of
democratic change, and also why it has been so difficult for him to hand over that power.
Chapter 2:
This chapter outlines the critical events of 1973-76. The revolution of 1973 was
extremely important because it began the end of a continual military rule that had been in
place since the revolution of 1932. Also, it reflects the reemergence of the power and
importance of the King in Thai society and politics at this point. It also highlights the
changes that had taken place in the Thai people and society as they staged their first
protest in favor of actual democratic change.
The events of 1976, in particular, highlight the King’s role at this point in the very
beginning of the democratic transition. His role in supporting the coup, the military, and

consequently the violence of 1976 is telling of his larger attitude towards the democratic
transition. His involvement in this situation sets the precedent that allows his continued
actions in the future in times of “political crises,” actions often inconsistent with
achieving full democracy.
Chapter 3:
This chapter addresses the events of 1992. As with 1973-76, there was a coup
and a democratic protest by the people. However, society and the people had evolved
much further by this point in time, in terms of economic status, education and other areas,
and the military had taken a decreasing role in politics. Thus, events unfolded differently
in 1992 than in 1973-76.
The role of the King was also different in this context. He is seen in a more
positive light as he stepped in against a military dictator that was threatening the progress
of democracy. However, I argue that again his actions were not to further the progress
of democracy, but to protect his interests in a manner consistent with his “conservative”
mentality.
Chapter 4:
This chapter addresses the final example of the King’s involvement and the effect
it had on democratic growth. The coup of 2006 was the most recent in Thai history and
was very significant, because it deposed the first popularly elected prime minister and
abrogated the first “people’s constitution that had been in place since 1997.
The King is said to have stepped in and supported the coup that removed the
“corrupt and authoritative” Thaksin (the sitting prime minister) from power. His actions
were considered by some as positive and necessary to save democracy. But the point of

this chapter is, once again, to show the King’s active role in politics and the debilitating
effect it had on further democratic growth.
Conclusion:
The conclusion of this thesis will evaluate the meaning of these events in more
detail, paying special attention to the actions of the King, his motives, and the
consequences of his actions. These events will emphasize my counter argument to the
commonly held beliefs I have outlined above. I then return to Huntington’s theory of
democratic transition through which I will ultimately evaluate the role of Thailand’s king
in the democratic transition.
Under Huntington’s theory of democratization, the king of Thailand fills the
traditional “role” but only up to a point. Fundamentally, he has yet to relinquish his
traditional source of legitimacy to democratic institutions and interfered with the
democratic transition such that it has not been completed.
Final Comment: Availability of sources
There is a final point to be made in regards to the research processes and
availability of sources for the thesis I am advancing. This point is that I have found
there is a serious lack of information in the form of any kind of analysis regarding the
subject of the current king of Thailand and the political situation. The King is an
extremely sensitive issue in Thai society today. Authors David Morrell and Chai-anan
Samudavanija explain this issue well in their book, Political Conflict in Thailand. “The
unwillingness to speak or write of the monarchy in relation to political activity is due to
the pejorative connotation…the king should not be touched by the vulgarity of the

political situation.”8 In this understanding, the King is essentially above politics and so
should not be discussed as such. Reinforcing this belief is the current lese majeste law,
which forbids anyone from speaking critically of the king or the institution of the
monarch under threat of severe punishment, which is imprisonment of up to fifteen years.
This law, one of the mainstays of continuing undemocratic traditions, is vaguely written.
It gives the prosecutors a wide scope in what they consider to be “critical” writing.
Kevin Hewison writes in his book, Political Change in Thailand, that “most Thai
academics are unwilling to comment on the monarchy due to the lese majeste laws.”9 He
also explains that while foreign academics would not be subject to these laws, there is
still an incentive to employ self-censorship due to the issues of implicating fellow Thai
scholars, fear of being banned from Thailand, and lack of willing publisher.
I have found this to be true in my research of the King. In many of the articles
and books I reviewed, especially regarding the three specific events outlined hereafter,
descriptions of the actions on the part of the King are non-existent, brief, or especially
non critical. When I did come across a study that was done that offered more insight, it
was the very topic of that article or book, placing the author’s objectivity and consequent
accuracy in doubt to some degree. Rarely did I find an article or book dedicated to some
other topic that would offer any type of insight to the actions or motives of the King.
Mostly, it was an all or nothing situation.
This being said, I am not surprised by this lack of information. Having spent the
summer in Thailand before I undertook the writing of this thesis, I came to understand
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first-hand the sensitivity of the subject of the King. The NGO I worked with, the
People’s Empowerment Foundation, repeatedly stressed to me the delicacy with which I
had to treat this subject. In my interviews with various political figures it became
obvious that the King could be a subject of interest, but never in a critical or questioning
manner. The only revealing conversations I had about the King were behind closed doors
at my work.

II.

BEFORE THE CONSTITUTION - KINGS RAMA IV-VII (1850-1932).
An evaluation of the reigns of Kings Rama 4, 5, 6, and 7 provides important

background for the circumstances and changes leading up to the Revolution of 1932 that
marks the beginning of the democratization period in Thailand. Each King was
responsible for changing the nation in a certain way, and developing the role of the
monarch, laying the foundation for democratic transition. Up until Rama 4, Siam was an
under-developed country and mostly cut off from the rest of the developed world. The
wave of colonization sweeping through Southeast Asia created the fear that Siam would
also become colonized by imperial powers. To avoid this, Rama 4 made the decision to
modernize the country to maintain independence in the face of the threat of imperial
invasion.
Rama Four: Mongkut (1851-1868)
The “modern period” of Thailand really begins with Mongkut, King Rama 4.
After serving as a monk for 27 years, he ascended to the throne in 1851. At the age of
47, he was well prepared to take the throne. As historian David Wyatt notes in his book,
A Short History, Thailand, the King’s, the King’s “religious life had not been cloistered;
indeed, he was better prepared for the throne by his monastic experience, having had the
opportunity to study and read widely, as well as to travel through the country and speak
with many people.”10 As he saw the neighboring countries fall under imperial power, he
realized that something must be done to preserve the independence of Siam. Western
powers questioned Siam’s form of monarchy, claiming that it was archaic and outdated.
10
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As noted expert Paul Handley writes in The King Never Smiles, “English newspapers in
Bangkok and Singapore attacked him for his assumption of deity, and for amoral antics in
his huge harem, and for the royal monopolies and corruption. It was all proof, they said,
of Siam’s need of colonization.”11 Responding to these threats, Mongkut made the
decision to modernize the country and the monarchy. He opened up Siam to international
trade in 1855 with the British.
The parameters of this trade agreement changed much of Thailand’s economic
system. These changes, especially the abolishment of monopolies, changed the basic way
the palace and government operated, in that the princes and palace officials relied heavily
on these monopolies for their livelihood.12 Not only did they have to find new sources of
revenue, but also economic opportunity began to arise that existed independently from
the palace and the patronage system.
In addition to the changes in the revenue system, a new openness towards
westerners was created. In order to cultivate good and diplomatic relations with western
powers, Mongkut opened up the country and his court to western visitors. Mongkut put a
new emphasis on western education, and invited western tutors into his home for the
purpose of teaching his children. Trading agreements similar to the original one with
England were made with several other countries, including the United States and France.
In doing this, Mongkut hoped to “avoid such suffocatingly close bilateral relationships as
those between British India and Burma, or France and Vietnman.”13 Playing upon these
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different imperial powers gave Siam the strength and protection it needed from
colonization by any one particular nation.
However, despite these major changes, imperial powers were wary of the lack of
modernization and changes in the government:
“Though one might have expected major internal changes commensurate with the
drastic shifts in foreign and fiscal policy, very little fundamental reform was
undertaken during Mongkut’s reign…The administration did not change.
Government was carried on in the homes of officials as it had been for centuries,
and it was characterized by Europeans as corrupt, inefficient and inhuman.
Justice remained highly personalized and heavily subject to the social and
economic pressures that could be mobilized by the individuals involved. The
civil administration was seen to be riddled with nepotism, its officers
remunerated largely by percentages of the business they transacted.”14

The imperial powers saw a corrupt government as a direct threat to their
economic interests, and so the threat of colonization still loomed. The British
government imposed sanctions, such as “imitations of import and export duties and other
taxation,” on their trading agreement to put pressure on Mongkut to reform his “corrupt”
system of government.15
Responding to his critics, Mongkut enacted more reforms. He saw the necessity
for more modernization in response to these threats, but knew that these reforms must be
enacted slowly and carefully so as not to incite a backlash from those that were used to
the old system. Most importantly, he could not infringe upon the patronage system that
was central to his power, as well as other powerful families he relied on.
And so the reforms Mongkut enacted were cautious and slow in nature. One of
the first reforms was to increase transparency in the government to a degree. He did this
by creating a “publication of a government gazette” where he allowed the laws of the
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kingdom to be printed. In addition he set up a system whereby his subjects could petition
their grievances to him directly. He did away with old “archaic” traditions surrounding
the monarchy. He allowed foreign advisers to become involved in his government. “In
addition, he attempted to make some social reforms by improving the condition for slaves
and allowing women to have some say in their marriage choices.”16
It is likely that Mongkut had more reforms in mind, but in 1868 he became ill
with Malaria and died. He had been preparing his eldest son Chulalongkorn to come
after him as King. He had given him an education that was infused with both Thai and
western elements, as well as an apprenticeship in politics so that he could learn the ways
of governing.17 However, when Mongkut died, Chulalongkorn was only fifteen years old.
He too had fallen ill with Malaria, and many suspected he would not recover. When he
did, he ascended the throne, but with Suriyawong as his regent. The first part of
Chulalongkorn’s reign as king would be overshadowed by the presence and power of
Suriyawong.
Elements helping to lay the foundation of democratization occurred under
Mongkut’s rule. His decision to modernize was a direct result of the threat of
colonization by foreign forces. To be sure, opening up Siam to the world saved the nation
from colonization. Imperial countries were able to pursue their economic interests
without becoming directly involved in governing the country, and no one country had a
larger influence than another due to the diversification of trade agreements. Aside from
these economic changes, which brought more wealth into the country, cultural changes
took place as well. Attitudes towards westerners became more open, and there was an
16
17
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increased encouragement and emphasis on western interaction and education. Reforms in
the government were less pronounced. But the monarch did became “more human” and
accessible to the public as well as to foreign visitors. The seeds of democracy were
beginning to take root as a call for a change in the “corrupt” system of government
currently in place began to arise, not just by foreign forces, but within the royal
household as well. While the changes enacted by Mongkut were well intentioned, and
were not the most radical in nature, they set the monarchy, the Thai government and the
rest of the country on a path of change that would not be stopped.
Rama V: Chulalongkorn (1868-1910)
While Mongkut was seen as the more radical reformer of his day, most of his
activities were in response to imperial threats, rather than acting of his on violation and
motivation to change. His reforms were eclipsed entirely by those enacted by Rama V,
who is said to have brought the most change to the country of Siam in all of history
during his 37-year reign. Not only did he modernize the country even further, but he
solidified more completely the power of the Monarch and its long lasting place in Thai
society.
As mentioned early, he ascended the throne at the early age of fifteen. He did not
have the experience or the following of people to be politically important at this time. In
addition, his power was controlled and overshadowed by the regent, Suriyawong, who
had a large and loyal following of older people in the court. The first period of
Chulalongkorn’s reign was thus dictated by this struggle of power, spanning from his
ascension in 1868 to 1883, the death of Suriyawong.

“It was only in 1873 that the character of the new ruler began to be evidenced
publicly...Chulalongkorn began a series of reforms that displayed his modern sentiments
and intentions.”18 He began to modernize the monarchy by “bringing his image closer to
earth.19 He began to make more public appearances, and even allowed others to touch
him. In addition, he abolished the custom that required subjects to prostrate themselves
before him.
As older members of the court began to die in the 1880’s, Chulalongkorn was
able to fill their positions with western educated princes from his family that were loyal
to him. With these princes, he created new branches of government that had “advisory,
investigatory, and legislative powers” called the Privy Council and Council of State.20
“Advised by his European counsels, he gave his government a modern bureaucratic
shape. Professional schools were established for the civil service.”21 In addition to these
reforms, he issued royal decrees that centralized the budget, which created a separate
budget for the palace, giving the royal family more power and financial freedom.
First Mention of Democracy
The king and his brothers had effectively consolidated power for themselves. But
the increase in the size and functionality of the government created new problems for the
King. And “providing modern educations to a new generation of Chakris and then to
non-royal service officials opened the door to new political ideas.22 A group of young
radicals began to question the King’s ability to effectively and govern and control a
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rapidly changing and growing government and nation. “In a strongly worded sixty-page
petition addressed to the King early in 1885, eleven young men strongly urged that the
king quickly move toward a system of parliamentary democracy under a constitutional
monarchy.”23
The King responded by stating that Siam was simply not ready for such a style of
government. He agreed with “their perception of a necessary connection between
domestic reforms and the maintenance of national independence,” but he emphasized the
need for educated men to carry out such an endeavor, of which he saw there to be a
shortage at the moment.24 He stated that “to introduce electoral and parliamentary
politics would weaken the state when it was most in need of unity and direction.”25 He
recognized the need for reform, but looking at his country, where “the bulk of agricultural
population had little political independence of mind,” and those with “any exposure to
modern education” only numbering in the few hundreds, the implementation of a true
representative democracy did not seem possible.26
The King took action in response to this petition by sending Prince Devawongse
“to study and report on the organization of European governments.”27 The prince
recommended “the formation of a cabinet of twelve equal ministries including the heads
of the seven old ministries and five new ones, the responsibilities of each to be newly
defined on functional lines… new ministries were to be created for public works, public
instruction, justice, army and privy seal.”28 This was the creation of the first real
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systematic bureaucracy that was set up to carrying out the King’s bidding. The ministers
began to form real traditions. They met regularly, recorded their meetings, and shared
information and advice more freely. The national agenda finally began to become
cohesive - people were working together in a procedural manner with oversight and
direction coming from the King, rather than as individuals pursing tasks out of self
interest without consultation.
Results of reforms
The main problem with the reforms was the haste in which they were attempted .
“There was not time to proceed cautiously and deliberately with reform. Western
demands for facilities and security had to be met quickly...because Siam’s modernization
had been so long delayed by political difficulties, the agenda of reform had been allowed
to pile up while the means of dealing with it had not yet been developed.”29 The reforms
were necessary, but resources such as money, institutions and qualified people, were not
quite ready to deal or implement them properly.
This problem worried the King - “he often despaired at the compromise that had
to be made, the work left undone, and the imperfections in the system that was being
developed.”30 He was concerned that perhaps the European system of governance and
ways of life were simply incompatible with the Thai values and people, and would never
be able to be properly implemented. After a trip to Europe, he realized that while the
compromises being made in the reforms process meant that development in Siam fell
short of the “European definition of modernity,” they still were still necessary and
possessed utility in that they “allowed the perpetuation of the best values of Siam’s
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civilization within a borrowed structure.”31 The importance of Siam retaining its national
and cultural identity while borrowing aspects of governance from European nation would
come to dominate future debates surrounding democracy.
Death of Chulalongkorn
Chulalongkorn died in 1910. Many changes had taken place during his forty-two
year reign. “If by 1910 Siam was not yet a modern nation, then at least it was a
modernizing nation, and securely so. In the face of foreign threats and not a little
domestic opposition, Chulalongkorn had created a new structure for the state that
possessed a dynamic of its own, an orientation toward change.”32
His reforms in regards to the composition and tradition of the government were
sweeping. He created a bureaucracy with the main purpose to bring about change to
reach western standards. He did this by recruiting men that had been exposed to western
education and therefore had western expectations. With this new goal in mind, he
changed the function and composition of the bureaucracy. His increased control over the
government allowed him to make these changes, and with these changes “the old order
simply withered away.”33 “By breaking the old social hierarchy and creating a new one,”
he was able to reestablish royal authority over the government in a way that had never
been harnessed before.”34 He was able to stage “a revolution from above in his program
of modernization.”35
The effects of modernization were being felt through out the country. Politically,
as a result of these changes, the first call for democratization began under Chulalongkorn,
31
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and would not die down until the Revolution in 1932. Unlike many other democracies,
the cal for liberalization and democracy was coming from the top down at its inception in
Siam.
RAMA 6: King Vajiravuduh (1910-1925)
Vajiravuduh became king in 1910. His reign was much different than those of
Rama 4 and Rama 5. He inherited a completely different country and so faced different
challenges. Foreign threat had all but abated and the country was well on it way to
modernization, although unevenly. His reign was shaped by the rising nationalist
sentiment that sweeping the world at that time.
Despite all of his years of preparation, “Vajiravuduh was not widely known or
popular nor did he have extensive networks of supporters and clients prior to coming to
the throne.”36 This being the case, he decided to expand his power through the military,
which previously had not been very prominent, by creating two new military
organizations. “The first was a new unit under the palace royal guard and “the second
was something completely new, the so-called Wild Tiger Corps, a nationwide
paramilitary corps.”37
One of his biggest contributions was the creation of Thai nation and Thai identity.
Looking to countries such as Japan, England and Germany, “He endeavored to imbue
Siam with the same unified, disciplined patriotic drive and sense of national duty that
those countries enjoyed.38 He believed that the nation should provide a form of identity
for its people, and that these people should share a common interest:
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“He envisioned structuring behavior and values primarily in terms of achieving
the nation’s goal: people should act in their personal lives in ways conducive to
the nation’s interest. In addition to logical concerns for national defense and the
achievement of international equality, he espoused ideas of economic
nationalism- freeing the economy from foreign control.”39

When it came to constructing Thai identity, “His formula was to direct his
people’s loyalty not toward the geopolitical or cultural state, but on the body of the king
himself.”40 Thus, he founded the Thai nation and consequently Thai identity on the idea
of the “nation-religion-monarch, an entity in which all three elements were inextricably
bound together. Allegiance to any one of the three meant loyalty to all three; disloyalty or
disobedience or disrespect toward one meant disrespect toward all.”41 The role of this
three-headed ideology in helping, or hindering democratization at different times is a
subject explored in this paper.
The King’s contributions to the modernization process were mostly social
reforms. He put an emphasis on expanding the culture of art, literature and the theatre,
not just for the royal elite, but for the whole public. He began many clubs, such as the
Enhancement of Knowledge Club, to promote and produce magazines and theatricals
which “espoused modern valued and patterns of behavior.”42 He also made changes in
regards to women and education. He advocated for monogamy and that women should
have a choice in their marriage. He also advocated for widespread modern education.
He made primary education compulsory by law for all boys and girls between the ages of
seven and fourteen. He created the first university in Bangkok, Chulalongkorn
University, as a memorial to his father.
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Problems during his reign
Despite the many positive changes Vijiravuduh made during his reign, it was also
rife with complications and controversies. The most important is the first instance of a
potential coup. The creation of the Wild Tiger Corps led to the first organized coup
attempt against the monarch. A plot was made between twenty-two young lieutenants in
the army, who felt personally disrespected by the creation of the Wild Tiger Corps and
the consequent downgrading of the army. These junior military officers decided to stage
a coup against the absolute monarchy on the grounds that “they considered Siam to be
backward, unjust, corrupt, and even morally debased. They had come to blame their
country’s ills on the existing system of government.”43 Although the plot was discovered
and arrests quickly made, it was the first direct challenge to the authority of the King to
take place in Siam. It was the first time anyone openly cited the King and his
government as the impediment to Siam’s goal of modernization.
In regards to the institution of the monarch, there were additional criticisms made.
“Vajiravudh apparently devoted little thought or attention to political changes. He
rejected all calls for political reform as selfishly motivated, disloyal and certain to bring
ruin to Siam.”44 Critics pointed out the contradiction that the King would support
modernization and development in all other areas of life, but not when it came to the
government.
Death of Vajiravudh- 1925
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Vajiravudh died at age forty-four in 1925 having produced no sons to inherit the
throne. Before his passing he named Prince Prajadhipok, Chulalongkorn’s youngest son,
to be his successor.
Although Vajiravudh’s reign was fraught with complication and controversy,
some positive change did take place. He reduced “the preeminence of the princes, his
brother and uncles,” by “promoting many commoners to higher positions in the stillexpanding government.”45 By doing this he was able to make the government seem more
democratic and professional, because it gave the impression that he was sharing power.
This was also important because it protected and encouraged the meritocratic system
which Chulalongkorn had introduced earlier as means of selecting individuals to serve as
officials in the government, thereby changing at least some aspects of the old patronage
system, giving power to a new set of people.
In addition, his creation of “nation-religion-king” paradigm provided the Thai
people with a cohesive identity they did not previously have.- expand on this p. 39
handley
Perhaps he most important aspect of Vajiravudh’s reign in regard to
democratization is the first occasion of political tensions. This was present in the
“attempted coup” by the young officers, who directed their anger towards the monarch as
the source of the country’s problems. In addition there was the elite’s general
dissatisfaction with the lack of modernization of political institutions such as the
monarch, as well as their criticism of the monarch’s accumulation of too much power.
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They believed that “it was logically impossible for him and his indefinitely to promote
change in everything but political institutions.”46
The Last Absolute Monarch- Prajadhipok (1925-1933)
Prajadhipok was not prepared for his reign as King. He had been educated in
England expecting to have a career in the army. His rise to the throne was the result of
several unexpected deaths of his older brothers. He lacked governmental experience, and
so was vulnerable to the opinions and positions of his older half-brothers and uncles who
had more experience in politics.
Prajadhipok inherited a country and government that had many problems - the
most crippling one being its financial condition. This caused much strain and turmoil
within the government as they sought to find a solution. “This governmental inefficiency
and semiparalysis…led a substantial segment of the urban elite...to lose, to some
immeasurable extent, faith in government, and at least to begin to question, if not to
challenge, the fundamental tenets of their social and political system based on the
absolute monarchy.”47
In combination with this dissatisfaction by the people was a new way to voice
such a sentiment. The creation of daily newspapers and weekly magazine allowed for the
publication and proliferation of this widespread discontent on a scale that had never
existed before. This widespread and heavily publicized criticism of the government left
the institution of the monarch more vulnerable than it had ever been.
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Therefore Prajadhipok’s task was to “restore confidence in the monarchy and
government.”48 He did this by creating the Supreme Council of State, a “super-cabinet
compromising the top-ranked and most experienced members of the royal family.”49
This council was created with the purpose of helping the inexperienced king deal with the
serious financial crises. Also, it brought power back into the control of the royal family.
For the time being the situation began to improve for Prajadhipok. The economy
was doing better, and so the financial pressure was temporarily suspended. But despite
this turnaround, danger still existed. Prajadhipok “knew many Bangkokians resented
royal privilege and monopoly on high positions, and he knew of the Thai students in
Europe who openly discussed alternatives like parliamentary democracy, national
socialism and communism.”50
To deal with this issue of political development, he sought the advice of Francis
B. Sayre in a memorandum headed “Problems of Siam.” In this memorandum he asked
many questions regarding the inevitability of parliamentary democracy in Thailand and if
“anglo-saxon” parliamentary government was really suitable for eastern people. For the
most part the King was open to change, but expressed some reservations over the
“readiness” of Thailand for representative democracy. In a memorandum titled
“Democracy in Siam” he stated the following;
“if it is admitted that some day we may be forced to have some form of
democracy in Siam, we must prepare ourselves for it gradually. We must learn
and we must educated ourselves. We must learn and experiment as to have an
idea as to how a parliamentary government would work in Siam…If we are to
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have a parliament, we must teach the people how to vote and how to elect
representatives who really have their interests at heart,”51

To follow this goal, Prajadhipok introduced an advisory Committee of the Privy
Council, as well as several experiments in municipal self-government. The Privy Council
was similar to the legislative councils enacted during previous reigns. But this council
worked ineffectively and was more for show than function. Members of the Supreme
Council argued “it put the monarchy in a bad light because it would propose things to the
throne, rather than only respond to royal requests.”52 In addition, Prajahidpok proposed a
prime minister to supervise the Supreme Council of State. This suggestion was met with
so much opposition that it was never created. Similar criticisms were made- one prince
argued “it would dangerously suggest to the people that the king no longer rule the
country.”53
The world wide depression of the early 1930’s created economic problems for
Thailand like everyone else, leading once again to public dissatisfaction. Criticism and
doubts of the government’s ability to govern efficiently were raised once again.
Receiving pressure form the royal family and members of the upper class, the King
passed policies that forced the middle class and the peasantry to bear the brunt of the
economic crises.
In the face of massive popular discontent and the threat of rebellion, the King
made the choice to enact some sort political reform in the direction of representative
democracy. He assigned the task to his foreign minister, Prince Devawong. With the
help of his American adviser Raymond Stevens, they drafted a new constitution. In the
51 Benjamin A. Baston, comp and ed., Siam’s Political Future: Documents from the End of the Absolute
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draft, the reforms introduced an appointed prime minister that would be given the
executive functions of the King, and would “preside over a cabinet responsible to a
legislative assembly, the membership of which would be half elected, and half
appointed.54 The King would still have the right to veto laws and policies, as well as
choose the prime minister. This draft was rejected by all of the princes and was not
adopted
The final fall -the coup of 1932
In the aftermath of the princes’ rejection of the constitution, they “again
overhauled the king’s economic reforms and further insulted themselves from new taxes,
while passing the burden to the middle class.”55 This appeared to be the final straw. A
coup was staged by a group of “middle-level officials” consisting of new bourgeois elite,
well-educated civil servants and army officers. They numbered only around one
hundred. They rounded up chief officials and sent a message to the King, who was
vacationing at Hua Hin, that he must agree to submit to a constitution. “The princes were
seized without violence, and the revolution was over in lass than 24 hours.”56 The King,
who had foreseen such an event, agreed to submit.
Aftermath of Revolution
The aftermath of the revolution was a dark time for the throne. With the throne
essentially stripped of all its powers, and facing a rising anti-royalist sentiment from the
bureaucratic elite and the populace at large, King Prajadhipok and the royal went into
exile in 1934. The king struggled unsuccessfully with the military to come back to
Thailand with the assurance he would regain some of his power. In 1935, when this did
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not happen, he abdicated the throne in favor of his successor, Ananda, who was then only
a boy and living abroad in Switzerland. Prince Ananda and his family, including Prince
Bhumibol, his brother would become the king, did not return to Thailand until 1946.
Thus marked a period of time in Thai history that is unusual in that it was “dominated not
by a king but rather by a handful of the promoters of the 1932 coup.”57
King Bhumibol
The purpose of this paper is not to summarize the events of King Bhumibol’s
reign, only to evaluate his actions in regards to the democratic transition. However, here
I will provide a brief summary of how he came to power, the first part of his reign, and
important aspects of his reign that are relevant to the democratic process.
King Bhumibol, or Rama IX, is the longest reigning monarch in the world. He
came ascended the throne in 1946, and has been there ever since. He is the monarch that
is the content of this paper. Eevery reference to “the king” hereafter, unless specified
otherwise, is in reference to Bhumibol.
Rama IX came to the throne in interesting circumstances. Being the second
eldest, he was not raised to be king. His brother Ananda was the first in line. However,
Ananda was found dead in room in 1947. His death has never been explained. It was in
this situation that Bhumibol, only 18 at the time, came to the throne.
Author Richard Hewison writes in his book “Political Change in Thailand,” that
when Bhumibol came to the throne he “inherited a position which had little political
power or influence.”58 This is the result of the situation that occurred leading up to and in
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the aftermath of the revolution of 1932 as mentioned earlier- the rise of the military and
anti-royalist sentiment.
This situation overshadowed the first part of Bhumibol’s reign. During the period
of 1946-1957, which was dominated by General Phibun who was staunchly anti-royalist,
the king was rarely involved in politics. “It was only after General Sarit’s twin coups of
1957-58, overthrowing the constitution and parliament and establishing highly
authoritarian regimes, that the monarchy’s positions was revived and the present king
given a higher profile. His interest in politics was encouraged by Sarit.”59
Bhumibol and the military, and conservatism
There are two main themes that dominated Bhumibol’s reign; his relationship
with the military and his conservative mentality. These two aspects are important to
understanding his actions in the subsequent chapters.
As demonstrated above, the king owes the resurrection of the monarchy to Sarit.
It was this act that began the long lasting relationship between the military and the king.
The immergence and importance is summarized by David Morrell and Chai-anan
Samudavanija in their book “Political Conflict in Thailand:
“Especially after Field Marshal Sarit seized power in 1957, a definite relationship emerged
between the military elite that rule Thailand and the royalty that reigned over it. Each needed the
other for continue pursuit of its own objectives. Neither fully trusted the other, but each had by
necessity found ways to accommodate the other’s fundamental requirements. Most directly, the
military’s continued control over the political process- as exemplified in its periodic seizures of
power- could not succeed without explicit or implicit support from the palace. At the same time,
the palace has depended increasingly on the military as the guardian of national security and the
continuity of the throne itself. Military leaders adeptly turned any opposition to the regime into
opposition to the royal institution.”60
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This give and take relationship has remained for the entirety of Bhumibol’s reign.
Although the military has declined in direct political power since these years, their role of
“protecting the national interest and continuity of the throne itself” explains their
continued presence in Thai politics in that the king necessitates their assistance. His
actions in the subsequent chapters will be analyzed according to this relationship.
The second theme of Bhumibol’s reign is his conservatism. Once the power of the
throne had been restored, many believed that Bhumibol would be committed to the cause
of change as his predecessors had. “Darling believed that the King would be a liberal and
democratic monarchy, with an interest in preserving freedom; however, this optimism
was misplaced..the present King’s legacy has been to define a conservative monarchy,
supporting stability and order, authority and tradition, developmentalism, unity and
solidarity, national chauvinism, and national security and anti-communism. Because of
its conservatism, this monarchy has not indicated any fundamental commitment to
democratic reform.”61
Hewison outlines the king’s conservative mentality. He states that his
conservatism embodies many beliefs and ideologies in relation to Thailand. First is his
interest in the preservation of values and traditions that are central to society. The king
believes that these values are upheld in the traditional institutions of Thailand, such as the
monarchy. Therefore there is no need for radical change of these institutions. Radical
change of these institutions could be detrimental to society because it would mean the
destruction of these important values.
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Secondly, Hewison states that the king emphasizes unity and discipline. “Such
themes have remained constant in King Bhumibol’s speeches.”62 The king stresses these
qualities because he sees them as essential to being an “advanced and well-off country.
The king believes that “unity prevents trouble, and where unity does not exists,
subversion and crime will be the result.”63
Hewison states that the king closely ties discipline and unity with law and order
and authority. He highlights that these two are constant themes in the king’s speeches
over the years. The king believes that without law and order, society would “degenerate
and become confused and unstable, and possibly collapse altogether.”64
Hewison states that this conservative mentality embodied by the king predisposes
him to authoritarianism. The king had a public dislike for politics, calling it a “filthy
business.” He also had a strong dislike for party politics, which is saw as “setting people
against each other rather than uniting them.”65 His mixed view of parliamentary politics
has led him to advocate not for western style democracy, but for a democracy that fits the
values and traditions of the Thai people. In a speech the king states:
“Thais..need not follow any king of foreign democracy and should try instead to create our own
Thai style of democracy, for we have our own national culture and outlooks and we are capable
of following our own reasoning.”66

This conservative mentality, which is for the preservation of “traditional values”
and all institutions that embody them, as well as a preference for order, stability and unity
over anything else, guided the king’s actions in the subsequent chapters.
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IV.

1973-1976: THE REVOLUTION AND ITS AFTERMATH.
Many forces gave rise to the “Revolution of 1973” and the events that took place

in the immediate following years. Two of the most important causes of the revolution
were the rapidly growing population and the change in its composition, especially the rise
of an educated and liberal-minded class of students.
“Economic and social change in Thailand have been rapid in recent years,
altering the very fabric of society. This has been overwhelmingly evident in urban areas,
especially Bangkok…By the 1970’s the gap between some changes and the stagnant,
traditional political system had become apparent.”67 In fact, the Thai population had
grown rapidly from 26 million in 1960 to 34 million in 1970.68 This explosive growth
placed a strain on land and resources, and the government was slow to deal with the
rising tensions.
These population changes were mostly a result of economic growth and the
change in the makeup of the economy. In the 1970’s the government shifted its policy
“toward the export-oriented industry away from the agricultural industry, although
agriculture still played a relevant and important part.”69 The shift in the economy led to
opportunities for people that did not previously exist, primarily in urban and suburban
areas.
The growth and change in the composition of the population, in turn, led to new
expectations by people in society. More and more, they began to demand new jobs,
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services, and land - resources that were not readily available. Thailand overall had not
adapted to all these changes taking place in society, and the government began to come
under attack as the increasing subject of blame.
Leading this new wave of change were the students. Education had become
more widespread in Thailand and was available to a much larger segment of the
population by the 1970s. This growth in education was seen as a positive change for
Thailand, but along with it came new pressures and issues in society as well.
“Government employment was not expanding as rapidly as the numbers of the
university graduates, and for the first time large numbers of young middle class
aspiring middle class thais had to consider entering careers in the private sector.
There they found themselves more vulnerable to economic fluctuations and to
judgment on the basis of their performance then they traditionally did in the civil
service. They felt relatively less secure and perhaps less certain of their social
standing.”70

This lack of availability of jobs for newly-educated students was attributed as a failure of
the government to respond to the needs of a changing society. Also, there was a new
awareness and desire for a government that could adjust to and represent the people’s
needs.
1968- 1973 An attempt at a Constitution
There had been pressure for a new constitution for many years. The military
rulers in place had not produced one since the take over in 1958. The pressure to do so
came from many places. First, there was international pressure from the US. “The
American press portrayed Thailand, after two decades and a billion dollars of U.S. aid, as
led by corrupt, inept and dictatorial generals.”71 There was fear of the US withdrawing
its support in the event a constitution could not be adopted.
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Upon returning from his tour of the United States in 1967, the King was also
concerned that a new constitution should be created. He experienced the international
pressure first hand, and was concerned for the stability and safety of his country in the
event that the US should withdraw their support.72 This external pressure was coupled
with growing internal social pressure, expressed through dissatisfaction by the students
and an emerging middle class. They were tired of military rule and wanted the type of
representative democracy they had read about and that had been promised to them.
In 1968, Prime Minister Thanom proposed a new constitution very similar to the
one originally adopted in 1932. It created a bicameral parliament, with the lower house
comprising of elected officials and the upper house containing officials appointed by the
King. But this new constitution did not last long and it did not satisfy the public’s
demands. “Although it was democratic on the surface, in its details the constitution
essentially legitimized Thanom’s military-dominated government.”73 Thanom’s party
won sweeping victories in the lower house, giving him full control of parliament. Despite
all the societal changes that had taken place, “the new regime was unchanged.”74
In addition, whatever its form, the new government did not work effectively.
The lower house had trouble getting a budget passed in a time when the country was
dealing with serious financial issues. People again questioned the government’s ability to
rule the country and to address the pressing issues. Student protests began to take place
with regularity, bringing media attention to the issue, which attracted international
attention once again. The United States representatives in their statements began to cast
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doubt on the nation’s stability. The rise of an insurgency in the countryside also
threatened national security and fueled calls for military action. Feeling his control
beginning to slip and the political situation on the brink of chaos, Thanom then staged a
coup against his own government in 1971. “The 1971 coup abolished the constitution,
parliament, and political parties, while the armed forces divided into several competing
factions.”75
This self-imposed coup led to the downfall of Thanom. In the past, a “strong man
approach to political crises” might have worked; but now, “society as a whole...no longer
seemed willing to accept a regime that appeared to represent only military interests in the
guise of national security and the public welfare.”76 In addition, the military was not as
cohesive and united as it once was. Many in the armed forces did not support the selfimposed coup and were unsatisfied with the result.
The biggest reaction, of course, came from the students who felt betrayed by this
act: “They had been led to expect political evolution, and their hopes were dashed by
Thanom’s re-imposition of military rule.”77 In addition, due to the King’s initial support
of a new constitution in 1969, the students felt they had royal consent in regards to their
protest. They defined their fight for democracy as defending the ideology of “the nation,
religion, king.”
Events came to a headon October 6,1973, when students were arrested for
distributing leaflets that called for the creation of a new constitution. In response,
“massive demonstration involving between 200,000 and 500,000 persons, including
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university students, secondary and technical school students, and many young members
of the middle class, demanded the release of the critics and the promulgation of the
constitution.”78 The detainees were given the option of being released on bail, which
they rejected. Continued demands were made for a constitution. In an article written by
David Morrell titled “Political Conflict in Thailand,” the events are outlined:
“The number of protestors in Bangkok and other major cities swelled to nearly
100,000 as the atmosphere of tension and fear turned to violence. Antiriot police
and soldiers turned on protestors, first with tear gas and within a matter of hours,
with hand grenades and rifles.. By October 14th..nearly a hundred demonstrators
were dead, and many hundreds had been injured.”79

The King denounced these acts of violence and “military heads refused to send their
troops against civilian mobs” (Wyatt, p. 288). Left without the support of the King or
parts of the military, Thanom and his counterpart Praphas were forced to resign, and flee
the country in exile.
Aftermath of the Revolution
The revolution of 1973 seemed to be a joyous occasion for Thailand. As David
Morell writes,” “There was great pride of accomplishment among those who had
participated in the events of October. Unarmed, they had overthrown the army with all
its weapons and tanks…The belief that the king, though innately conservative, had
intervened on behalf of his people and against the military gave rise to the further
expectation that he would continue to support the forces of reform and social justice.”80
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Although they did not bring an end to the military’s role in politics, there was at least “a
new consciousness of the necessity of sharing political power.”81
In the immediate aftermath of the 1973 revolution, the students were considered
heroic for the part they played in seemingly bringing an end to authoritarian rule and
reinstating a democratic government. They had the support of most of the people,
although the students’ views and hopes were certainly more extreme than most. In
addition, the students were believed to have the blessing and support of the King. Many
Thais saw the possibility of a unified, peaceful nation moving towards a democratic
future. However, problems were soon to develop that would cut this “democratic
experiment” short.
Certain changes took place in the immediate aftermath of the 1973 revolution.
First there was the creation of a new government and constitution. “The initial outcome
was a civilian government under Prime Minister, Dr. Sanya Dharmaskati…A constitution
calling for a unicameral, fully elected parliament was promulgated, and elections were
scheduled for 1975.”82
A second important change took place in society itself. There was a rise in new
and more outspoken political organizations and activities formed not just by students, but
peasants, farmers and workers. The democratic reforms invited a new feeling of
freedom, and invited people to voice more openly criticisms of the previous government
and what expectations they had from the new government. “Suddenly, demonstrations
were not only permitted but pervasive. Every day, it seemed there was a new
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demonstration against something; and strikes too, where before than had not been labor
unions.”83
On the surface these were good changes. The government was shifting away
from its authoritarian traditions. People were becoming more involved in the political
process - an essential component of democracy. However, in reality these political
changes did not prove easy to implement:
“The participant institutions created after the October 1973 were the
strongest that Thailand had seen to date; but they were vastly inadequate
to the tasks required. Formal structures established in the new constitution
were quite democratic…However, it took the system so long to
promulgate its new procedures (fifteen months from the uprising to the
January 1975 election) that many activists were already disillusioned.”84

In addition, the rise of social activism was causing anxiety among members of the
conservative elite as well as in the monarchy.
Problems begin to Arise
The fragility and inefficiency of the political system began to show with the 1975
elections. The rise of new political organizations and an increase in the amount of parties
led to serious fragmentation. “Forty-two political parties had been formed, espousing
unclear and overlapping platforms.”85 This “confusion and complexity was far more than
the voters could comprehend.”86 As a result, no party won a clear majority. Kukurit
Pramoj, leader of the moderate Social Action party, formed a shaky coalition
government. The instability of the new government just two years after the revolution
led many to begin to doubt the democratic reforms, and others to withdraw their support.
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A second problem involved changes in the student movement. The movement was
mainly responsible for the overthrow in 1973 and many had supported the students in
their efforts. However, after 1973, the student movements began to become radicalized
and fragmented and much more aggressive in the pursuit of their goals. “Before a week
had passed, student groups were factionalized, fragmented, and out of control due to
personal rivalries, petty jealousies and lack of agreement on what to do with their newfound power.”87 In addition, their focus was becoming scattered, with many student
leaders breaking off from the main movement sending their own teams to “the most
remote, poverty-stricken rural part of the country, while other students, in their group
concentrated their efforts on slum dwellers in the capital.”88
This change in the student movement combined with the rise in political activists
and creation of labor organizations ultimately constituted the rise of the “leftist”
movement in Thailand. It came at a time when fear of communism was high in the
world. Long allied with the United States, Thailand historically was staunchly anticommunist. As a result, many began to characterize the actions of the students and other
leftist activists as communist, and therefore a threat to national security and the
conservative tradition of the nation, embodied in the “nation, religion and king.” “The
monarchy, the urban elite, and much of the middle class had become frightened by the
radicalism of the students, whom they viewed as either communist directed of inspired.
Their support soon swung to a variety of new organization of the right wing, most of
which had backing in the military and bureaucracy.”89 The loss of the support of these
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segments of society of people was a huge blow to the “leftist movement.” Rightist
organizations that were created in reaction to the leftist movements now began to gain
momentum and power.
Mobilization of the right:
Things began to back away from the promise of real democracy:
“By mid-1975, the forces of the right had recovered quite well. They still had
plenty of money and bureaucratic power. ..Threatened by the new forces of
change, the right and the so-called silent majority began to strike back at the left,
and especially at the students. A variety of new rightist organization emerged,
principal among them the Red Gaurs, Nawaphon, and the Village Scouts..such
mobilization on the right..led quickly to a sharp polization in society at large.”90

These rightist organizations mobilized on a scale never seen before.91 They cleverly
connected their organizations with the ideology of “nation, religion, king,” and so while
these organizations were mostly agents of elite power, by using this mantra they attracted
Thai citizens from every social standing. With this “ideology” they were able to
“convince many Thais that the student-farmer-labor movement was indeed dedicated to
destruction of the institutions and values they held dear.”92
Thus, rather then a society moving together towards democracy, there was
developing polarization of the left and right, sowing instability and fear. This situation
was exacerbated the already struggling government. “By 1976, political
assassinations…were commonplace. Police harassed the electioneering of leftist parties,
and even active moderates were afraid for their safety. Violence, vituperation and
incivility were now part of public life as they never had been before in Thailand.”93
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In just three years, the popular opinion of the student movement, once heralded as
bringing democracy to the country, had completely turned around. They were now
perceived as enemies in many quarters and received the lion’s share of the blame for the
current state of chaos. A magazine at the time reported the Buddhist extremist
Kittiwutho as stating: “such a killing is not killing persons because whoever destroys the
nation, religion or the monarchy, such bestial types are not complete persons. Thus, we
must intend not to kill people but to kill the devil; this the duty of all Thai.”94 By 1976,
the attitude of many people was one bordering panic and a desire to go to great lengths to
rectify the situation.
Coup of 1976
The government was simply too unstable and ill equipped to deal with all the
issues at hand. “Polarization of the leftist and rights movements resulted in frequent and
random violence. “People in Bangkok were afraid. They recalled the haunting refrain
that a nation with problems cannot afford democracy. No, they did not want Praphas and
Thanom back; but yes, the present unstable situation was unacceptable.”95
The catalyst leading up to the student protests at Thammasat University was the
re-entry of the previously exiled Thanom and Praphas. Praphas returned under the
premise that he needed specific medical attention, while Thanom returned to live his life
as a Buddhist monk. Both of these returns were supported and welcomed by the right
wing and were given military protection. The royal family also approved of their return,
even visiting Thanom at his monastery . Of course, their return caused great turmoil in
Bangkok. “The university students were outraged at this reception of one held
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responsible for the violence of 1973, and daily demonstrations began, especially at
Thammasat University.”96
The right wing was quick to respond, bringing attention to the protests and
mobilizing “true patriots” against the “communist” students that were trying to bring ruin
to the country. The sentiment expressed by the extremist monk embodied their mission,
which was that violence was acceptable when it was against one who was an enemy of
the country. The final straw was when the students, in one of their protests, staged a
mock hanging. An ultra rightist newspaper published a photograph of the events,
claiming the person being hung was meant to represent the Crown Prince Vairalongkorn.
The students were then accused of “lese majeste” and declared enemies of the crown,
making them enemies of the nation. In the aftermath of this event, “Massive assaults
were launched against Thammasat University, in which Village Scouts, Red Gaurs, the
police and other engaged in an orgy of violence. Students were lynched, burned alive,
and beaten..”97 “Female students were raped, alive and dead, by police and Red
Gaurs.”98 After several hours the violence finally abated. At this point the previous
“democratic” government was dissolved. In its place, a military junta was installed, with
royal endorsement, calling themselves, the “National Administrative Reform Council.”99
The rationale for the 1976 coup was that it would restore peace and order. The
military, supported by the monarchy and other rightist groups, felt that “the public at
large, dissatisfied with the results of an open political system since October 1973, might
be willing to forgive and quickly forget - if domestic stability appeared a likely reward
96
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for the sacrifice of representation, and if a coup could restore stability without
violence.”100 The violence horrified many, but was seen as necessary and justified by the
ruling order to save the nation from “the communist threat.” Furthermore, “the generals
who seized power declared...the takeover of power…is aimed at safeguarding the
institution of the monarchy. The king and the royal family are being protected.”101 And
so the democratic experiment that began in 1973 with great promise --but no sufficient
foundation or infrastructure --came to a violent end just three years later.
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V.

THE COUP OF 1992 AND ITS AFTERMATH.
While the coup of 1991 and later events bear some similarities to the 1973-1976

period, in most ways they are very different due to developments that took place in the
post-1978 era. The constitution put in place in 1978 lasted until the coup of 1991. A new
political awareness had taken hold in the people.
According to the scholar Sukhumbhand Paribatra in his article, “State Society in
Thailand: How Fragile the Democracy?,” what took place in the post-1978 era was
“liberalization without democracy:”
A mixed system with significant liberal characteristics, including relatively high
degrees of political and personal freedom, but without substance of Western-style
democracy, It was a system where society became more equal to, but was still a
large extent dominated by the state and those in control of the state apparatus.”102

Paribatra reports, first, that political parties were able to grow and benefit from
the rapidly growing economy. They were able to exist outside of the traditional
bureaucracy, garnering support from many “extra bureaucratic groups” and became
effective and important in “policy-implementation and policy-making.”103
Second, there was an expanding role for the private sector and non-governmental
organizations (NGOs).104 These organizations were important because they often
represented the needs of people who were over looked in the traditional policy making
process. Usually, this meant poor people who did not have a strong affiliation with any
party, lacking the money to invest and represent their interest.
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Third, growing “liberalization” was reflected in an increased freedom of
intellectual expression in the media.105 “The stated continue to control radio and
television, but there were increasing sign of independence, not only in selection and
production of programs but also in coverage and presentation of news stories.”106
A fourth change was the liberalization of the armed forces.107 According to
Paribatra here was a “newer generation of officers that were much more exposed to ideas
and perspectives from the outside world than their predecessors.”108 They were more
accepting of having a less direct role in politics, and of the “principle and practice of
popular political participation.”109
These changes were indicative of larger social and economic changes that were
taking place in society post-1978. The economy grew in “an unprecedented manner,
reaching double digit growth rate at the end of the 1980’s. Also unprecedented was its
integration into global trade, investment communication and informational systems.”110
The level of education rose at an unprecedented rate and the number of people with
higher education in the 1980’s was up to 15% from 2% in the 1960s.111
Liberalization does not mean Democratization
Although there were liberalizing changes, as described above, they did not result
in actual democracy. Despite the changes, the political parties failed “to institutionalize

105

Paribatra, p. 883
Ibid.
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid.
109 Ibid.
110 Ibid.
111 Ibid.

106

themselves as true representative of the people.”112 The old ways of influencing policy,
such as through the bureaucratic system of patronage, still held sway. This left out the
majority of the population, meaning those who did not have money or connections. The
political parties mostly formed ties and were accountable to “big businesses” or “local
magnates,” who they could depend on for electoral success.113 They did not put much
effort into establishing “grass roots” organizations to connect with larger amounts of
people, because they did not need their support for “electoral success” or “political
achievement.”114 As a result, they were not accountable to the majority of the people.
And because this type of relationship between business and politician proved to be
lucrative, elections were rarely fair or clean.115 This type of electoral system did not
“promote, either in quantitative or qualitative terms, voluntary political participation.”116
The failure of these political parties led to the continuation of the strength of certain state
structures:
“The political changes that had begun in the early 1970’s left largely unaltered
the organizational attributes of civilian and military bureaucracies with their
capacity, buttressed by a vast body of laws, decrees, and legal or administrative
precedents, to preserve for themselves extensive areas of responsibility in policy
formulation and implementation, especially in rural areas.”117
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These bureaucracies insulated themselves from change by condemning politicians and
voluntary political participation as corrupt and inefficient, while claiming that they
represented and protected the nation’s “true” interests.”118
The most powerful enduring bureaucracy remained the military. While it is true
that they had liberalized in some respects, their interest in remaining in power was the
same and at odds with objectives of democracy. They justified their continued presence
in politics by claiming they alone could protect the “Nation, Religion, and Monarchy,”
and thus were the protectors of national security.119 They reserved the right to intervene
politically whenever they saw the need. “All of this suggests that the military rejected the
underlying ideals and political consequences of Western-style liberal democracy, and
preferred bureaucratically guided liberalization expressed in terms of limited, controlled
participation that emphasized consensus over competition, a minimally active legislature
over an active and potent one, appointments over elections, and centralization over
decentralization of power.”120
1991 Coup
The idea that elections would not result in efficient and honest government was
still widespread, not just among the military, but among proponents of democracy as
well. There was fear that “there was no guarantee that free elections would bring
competent, honest people to the legislature” and that “political parties were basically no
more than “trading companies,” corrupt and bent on pursuit of power and self-
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interest.”121 This was the rationale of the military leaders who led the coup in 1991. In
accordance with the right they reserved for themselves in politics, they declared that in
order to protect the national interest, they needed to intervene and put a new government
in place. The existing Chatichai government was seen to be highly corrupt. With the
blessing of the King, the coup was carried out by a the military junta – called the National
Peacekeeping Council - led by General Suchinda.122 The author David Van Praagh
describes in his book, “Struggle for Democracy” how the NPC “dissolved the legitimate
government and the parliament and imposed martial law…the high command abolished
the 1978 constitution as amended in 1983 to limit military influence.” 123
This coup was regarded as a huge set back for the growth of democracy. This
was the first time direct military intervention had taken place since 1978. At this point in
time, Thai society, especially the middle class, had developed to the point that it would
no longer be acceptable to have prolonged military control of the government. Many
tolerated the justification for the coup, but they expected the military to hand back power
as quickly as they could.
At the onset, the military made promises reassuring the public they would not be
in power for long. They scheduled elections to take place in the following year, and
General Suchinda promised he would relinquish power and not run for the position of
Prime Minister. They also put in place an “interim” constitution and government,
approved by the King, just five days after the coup. The new government was led by the
appointed Prime Minister Anand, who was “nonpolitical” and was known for his work in
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the “Thai foreign ministry as ambassador to the united states, the united nations, Canada,
and West Germany.”124 His interim government was filled with “technocrats and
businessmen” and was mostly non-corrupt and fairly progressive in trying to implement
social and economic reforms.125
Aftermath of the Coup
While on the surface it seemed that power would be back in the hands of civilians
after the next elections, changes were enacted by the military that began to cast doubt on
their original promise. The junta began to consolidate their power in a number of ways.
As Van Praagh reports, they “stacked the interim legislative assembly to draft a new
constitution and pass laws, with 148 military officers making up a majority of 292
members.”126 To get rid of labor unrest, they outlawed labor unions; and in their
investigation of “corrupt” official in the previous government, they “announced that the
inquiry into corruption in high places would not extend to well-to-do military officers.”127
Suchinda, despite his promise not to become involved in politics, set up a political party
called the “Justice Unity Party” that was set to run in the upcoming elections.128 The
junta also promoted changes to the new constitution that would further consolidate their
hold on the government, by supporting “an appointed senate equal or greater in power to
an elected lower house.”129
The public was alarmed at the changes taking place. The fear that the military
junta was not just temporarily removing a corrupt government, but would remain in
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power, was becoming more real by the day. The public felt that the military was staging
a “constitutional coup.”130 As a result, a significant protest against the interim
constitution took place, harkening back to the events of 1973, but now almost 20 years
later. Numbering around 100,000 people, this protest was called the “largest prodemocracy protest since October 1973 student-led march.”131
The reaction by the military was split. They got rid of some pro-military tenets,
decreasing the power of junta-appointed senate. However, many of the provisions
stayed. One faction wanted to get rid of all democratic provisions; to create an appointed
senate that was more powerful than the lower house and to allow that the prime minister
not be an elected MP.132 The protestors saw the weakness in this indecision by the junta
and decided to schedule another protest.133 At this moment, the King decided to
intervene. On his birthday broadcast, he told the Thai people “that compromise had gone
as far as it could for the time being, and further pressure on the military might cause
another coup and deeper division in Thailand.”134 As a result, the second protest was
called off, and the new constitution, with the “retrogressive” provision for the senate, was
ratified.135
Elections of 1992 and Aftermath
The importance of the creation of the military’s political party became apparent
after the 1992 elections. Their party was able to create a pro-military coalition that
captured enough seats to become the majority, thus allowing one of their own to become
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prime minister. After a few days of debate, Suchinda emerged as the man they wanted to
represent their coalition and to be the prime minister.
These events were the final straw for the people. They were outraged at the
results of the elections, which they saw as clearly manipulated in favor the military. But
what was even more upsetting was that Suchinda had gone back on his word. His
justification for the coup was to displace the current corrupt government, and to give
power back to the people so that they could create a truly democratic government. “Not
many had mourned the overthrow of the Chatichai government because of its alleged
corrupt practices; nor did many voice their opposition to the forceful dissolution of the
1978 constitutional system that was perceived to have made such a corrupt regime
possible.”136 Suchinda had promised that the military would step aside, and that he
personally would not attempt to become prime minister. But with this final act, it became
“evident to many that the junta took over for the sake of monopolizing power,” and that
Suchinda had positioned himself so that he may stay in power as prime minister.137 In all
of these actions, the King had not stood in the way.
Protests Begin Again
In May 1992, just after the elections in March, the peaceful protests began. The
public was outraged by the military’s blatant attempt to stay in power despite their earlier
promises. Academics began writing opinions that Suchinda was unlawfully occupying
the office of prime minister and should step down immediately. Suchinda responded by
refusing to step down. The main leader of the protests, Chamlong, sat outside the
parliament building, claiming that he would refuse to eat until Suchinda stepped down.
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Soon, more than 80,000 Thais joined him in peaceful protest. But Suchinda continued to
remain adamant that he would not step down.
The composition of the protestors was much different than that of the student-led
protests of 1976:.
“Whereas the anti-military movement of the early 1970’s was led by and
consisted of students and the more radical elements of Thai society, the antisuchinda movement was very broad based both in leadership and rank-in-file
participation. Prominent among the leaders were elected politicians, former
bureaucrats and military officers, NGO leaders and 1970’s-vintage student
activists, many of whom were now involved in successful careers in the private
sector.”138

The protests began to escalate due to lack of response on the part of the Suchinda
regime. People were arriving in larger numbers and the atmosphere was beginning to
turn from one of peace to one of tension and hostility. Suchinda called in parts of the
armed forces and riot police to contain the growing crowd. Suchinda promised not to
carry out acts of violence against the protestors, but did reserve the right to counter-attack
in the event that the protestors became violent. The presence of the police and armed
forces added to the hostile environment, as the protestors became fearful of being
provoked into violence. Furthermore, because the state controlled the media, most of the
coverage of events was “sharply slanted” towards the military-led government and
“conveyed the impression that the protestors were troublemakers threatening law and
order.”139 This unfair portrayal enraged the protestors even more.
The activists appealed to the King to help resolve the crises.140 They sent him a
petition asking to dissolve the lower house of parliament and to hold new elections.
Rather than take such bold action, the King responded by calling both members from the
138
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government and opposition to come to some sort of compromise. They agreed that there
would be amendments made to the constitution, “including a requirement that the prime
minister be an elected MP,” which would call for the resignation of Suchinda.141
However, the leader Chamlong “called for a bigger rally than ever…if Suchinda and his
allies did not keep their promise by then to go along with the constitutional changes that
first and foremost, would force the prime minister to resign.”142
The deadline came but no amendments had been agreed upon. The protests
resumed, in larger numbers than ever before. “Students and teachers, business and
professional people, and workers and political activists” took to the streets and shouted
“We will respect...the three institutions of nation, religion, and king!”143 The security
forces reacted immediately, soaking the protestors with dirty water from water cannons.
This act was said not so much to injure the crowd or prevent violence, but to provoke the
middle class as this was highly disrespectful, and it had the intended effect - the
protestors responded by throwing rocks at the police.144
The violence that erupted for the next three days was “the most violent use of
force against civilians in the history of Bangkok.”145 Police and armed forced were
allowed to fire directly on civilians. Many instances of beatings and clubbings took
place. This level of violence was similar to that of 1976, but this time the violence lasted
for three days. The protestors, despite the extreme brutality, gave no sign of giving up.

141

Van Praagh, p. 249
Ibid.
143
Id. p. 254
144
Ibid.
145
Paribatra, p. 889
142

In fact, “its participants appeared ready to withstand more until the King’s intervention
on the fourth night of the crises.”146
The King’s Intervention and Aftermath
The King came on television with both Suchinda and the protest leader Chamlong
at his feet. It was said he “lectured Suchinda and Chamlong as if they were errant school
boys.”147 The imagery of the scene conveyed just as much meaning as the words the King
spoke. He was seated above the other two, signifying that the monarchy remained above
politics and any political figure.148 Both Suchinda and Chamlong were seated at the same
height, signifying that both the military and the democracy movement were of equal
status.149 In his speech the King said;
“I would like both of you to talk face to face, not to confront each other, because
this is our country. They country belongs to us, not to two people…If this goes on,
it will put the country in great danger, making Thailand a meaningless country.”150

The King’s statements supposedly encouraged constitutional liberalization and
amounted to a rejection of the military’s presumptions and tactics.151 The King also let
Suchinda know that he could resign before or after the amendments were made, but he
made clear “that fulfillment of the first demand by the democracy movement was only a
matter of timing.”152
With the King’s intervention, the violence ended, and Suchinda finally resigned
his office of Prime Minister. In his place, Anand was again set up as interim Prime
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Minister, and with the aid of technocratic government, he “successfully restored political
tranquility and behavioral decency,” to Thailand’s government.153 In addition, they
“transferred the top members of the junta to inactive posts...and organized a relatively
clean and orderly general election.” 154The new elections brought the Democrat party to
power, “winning the most seats and leading to the appointment of their leader, Chuan
Leekpai.”155
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VI.

COUP OF 2006.
The coup of 2006 is the most recent in Thai history and it is also the coup in

which the King’s influence was most present. But it was much different than the
previous coups in 1976 and 1991. Rather than a confrontation between military powers
and a civilian movement, the impetus for the 2006 coup was a political figure, then Prime
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and his party. Thaksin was elected into office in 2001 and
remained there until the coup in 2006. His party, their rise to power, and his tenure in
office marked an important new era in Thai politics.
Thaksin was not a member of the traditional bureaucratic elite, nor did he have
close personal relations with the King. He came to power by unprecedented means in
Thai political history, through open elections. The ideology embodied by his political
party Thai Rak Thai (TRT) was a mixed one, which relied on the success of appealing
both to the business elite and the rural masses. Drawing support from these two
demographics, he was able to achieve a sweeping victory in the 2001 elections.
Essentially, there were three main reasons for the rise of Thaksin and his party: the
changes that took place under the 1997 constitution; the economic crisis of 1997; and the
creation of the TKT and its unprecedented populist policies. Each of these factors is
explored briefly below.
Constitutional changes
The 1997 constitution marked a significant moment in Thai political history. As
Scholar James Klein states in his article, “The Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand
1997,” during the “first 60 years of Thailand’s constitutional history, there were no
serious attempts to reform the political process and its associated problems of

inefficiency and corruption.”156 The 1997 constitution was thus the first real attempt to
establish meaningful constitutional authority and initiate reforms that could lead to a
more accountable and democratic government. “It establishes the constitution as the
basis for all law, thereby reducing the bureaucracy power to subvert constitutional intent.
For the first time in Thai history, it establishes a judicial review process independent of
executive branch control, thereby enhancing both government accountability and the
protection of civil liberties.”157 In addition, it was the first constitution to be written
directly “by the people,” with a “99-member Constitution Drafting Assembly (CDA) was
composed of two indirectly elected groups: 76 members representing each province, and
23 recognized political, administrative, and legal experts.”158 Also unprecedented, the
process was open to the public, allowing debate on many of the issues.
These reforms were spurred by the events of 1992. The public was clearly
displeased with the nature of politicians and government before the coup of 1991; and
with the restoration of civilian government in 1992, they had high expectations for a new
and reformed system. It was clear they would not stand for going back to the corrupt
practices of the past. Duncan McCargo and Ukrist Pathmanand summarize the people’s
attitude towards the government at this time in their book, “The Thaksinzation of
Thailand,” as follows:
“Public dissatisfaction with the quality of Thai politicians and of the political
system had produced growing demands for reform in the wake of May
1992…Political parties were much-critized as factionalized alliances of interest
groups, divorced from the concerns of the electorate. Practice such as candidatebuying (encouraging electable politicians to switch parties by using financial
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inducements), vote-buying and the corruption of government officials made the
electoral process wide open to manipulation and abuse.”159

The Constitution of 1997 was meant to address these issues by enacting liberal
reforms that would change the system to increase public participation and put in place
restrictions so as to decrease corruption and create a more accountable government.
Scholar Sombat Chantornvong summarizes in Duncan McCargo’s book, “Reforming
Thai Politics,” many of the changes that were made in the 1997 constitution. Among
these were the changes in election of the house to single-member constituency, the
creation of a party list system, a new directly elected senate with increased powers as
well as new restrictions, the creation of an Electoral Commission and other independent
agencies such as the National Counter Corruption Commission, a Constitutional court,
and a National Human Rights commission and new limitations making it more difficult
for candidates to change parties.160 These changes were intended to create a stronger and
more professional senate, free and fair elections, and to give more power and control to
citizens over the government and bureaucracy. While many of these changes proved
difficult to fully implement and were far from successful, they did drastically alter what
had been the traditional make-up of the political scene and the process of political life in
Thailand.
Economic crises of 1997
The second factor contributing to the rise of Thaksin and his political party was
the economic crises of 1997 which came about, in part, due to massive speculation in
regard to the Thai baht. The party in power at that time, the New Aspiration Party,
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refused to devalue the baht which led to the economic crises. This crises helped bring
about Thaksin’s rise to power in two ways: it led to the downfall of the Democratic Party,
which had taken over, and it caused many “business” families to become directly
involved in politics.
The Democratic Party took over as the economic crises set in. As written by
Kevin Hewison in “A Book, the King and the 2006 Coup,” the Democratic Party came to
power in 1998 when the previous party failed to solve the financial crises.161 The
Democratic Party’s solution was to accept an offered IMF bailout. The measures
imposed by the IMF involved “financial restructuring, accelerated privatization, massive
state and corporate reforms and huge inflows of foreign investment.”162 However, these
measures drove Thailand further into recession and the Democratic Party suffered
significant loss of support as a result. They were “accused of destroying domestic
capitalism and ceding sovereignty over economic policy to outsiders and engaging in the
fire sale of Thai assets to foreigners.”163 This situation helped clear the way for Thaksin,
a self-made billionaire with significant business experience, and his party that supported
the rights of the business elite, to rise to power.
The second cause was the effect that the crises and the IMF policies had on the
“big business families” or the business elite. Previously, the business elite had remained
behind the scenes, influencing policy indirectly by donating money to political parties.
This changed after the economic crises of 1997 when they realized they could benefit and
protect their interests if they were more directly involved in politics. In addition, the
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liberal reforms that took place under the new constitution lowered the barriers of entry
into the political scene. As cited by Patana Tangpianpant in her thesis “Thaksin
Populism and Beyond:”
“Thaksin and his close allies…took advantage of the situation…and created a
new party that was composed of primarily big business families. This party was
called Thai Rak Thai (TRT)…Their objectives were to use political power in
order to rid the country of the IMF, to stop foreign firms and investments from
taking over local businesses, and more generally to direct economic growth their
way. Thaksin’s party represented the rise of the businesspeople as politicians.”164

The rise of TRT
The third reason for the rise of Thaksin has to do directly with the message and
success of his political party. The constitutional reforms had altered the political system
that paved the way for the emergence of TRT. The economic crises gave purpose to
creation of Thaksin’s party and for his entry into the political scene. But another change
took place that was perhaps the most significant. “Thaksin recognized that the 1997
constitution demanded a different politics. Previously, political parties relied on vote
buying and influential local figures to deliver voters and power. TRT hit on a different
strategy, deciding to get its votes by appealing directly to voters.”165
This was the first time that broad populist policies were promoted by a political
party in Thai history. In the 2001 elections, TRT played on the problems which existed
as the result of the economic crises - they promoted the rights of the business elite, but
they also promised to “pour government money into rural areas,” in the form of social
programs such as “universal health care, soft loans for every community, a three year
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debt moratorium for farmers, and a “peoples” bank.”166 No one had ever appealed to the
rural masses in such a way before, and the result was very clear. The support of the rural
masses combined with that of the business elite led Thaksin to a resounding victory in the
2001 elections, capturing 12 million votes, or around 40 percent of the total vote. “The 6
January 2001 elections completely reshaped the political landscape in Thailand: on 9
February 2001, 339 of the 500 MP’s in the new lower house voted for Thaksin to become
prime minister. This was an unprecedented parliamentary majority.”167
Time in office and rise of the opposition
Thaksin came into office riding a wave of popular support. However, his regime
got off to a tumultuous start when he was accused of concealing assets prior to his
election. “In 2000, the NCCC voted 8:1 in favor of punishing Thaksin…Nevertheless the
case was never brought to trial.”168 Once he got into office the issue was brought before
the Constitutional Court. Thaksin rushed his populist policies through, recognizing that
he as long as he maintained popular support the courts could not condemn him or risk
massive protests.169 As a result, the Constitutional Court voted Thaksin not guilty.
Despite this initial setback, Thaksin and his party were successful in the early
years in office. “The economy recovered and domestic capital was strengthened.”170
Thaksin and his party enjoyed another landslide victory in the 2005 elections, winning
42% of the vote.
Nonetheless, opposition began to surface in a number of different places to
Thaksin’s regime. First were the enterprise unions, who had previously supported the
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TRT due to their opposition to the IMF regulations. However, as the government began
to privatize, these unions began to organize rallies and “accuse Thaksin and his allies as
benefitting by the sale of the state enterprises.”171
Second, the public at large began to grow wary of Thaksin’s regime. By 2006, his
regime had become increasingly repressive, relying on tactics such as censorship of the
media and political imprisonment to silence people who opposed his rule. In addition,
while many members of the middle class had originally supported his “war on drugs” in
southern Thailand, as huge human rights violations began to surface, many became
horrified and withdrew their support. “There were more than 2000 extra-judicial killings
in an anti-drugs campaign and sometimes brutal efforts to control southern separatism. A
number of human rights activists also disappeared or were killed in this period.”172 The
autocratic nature of his regime was alarming to many who had supported his rise to
power.
Perhaps the most dangerous and influential opposition came from the bureaucratic
elite and the monarchy. Thaksin’s reign and newfound power challenged the traditional
bureaucratic elite that had been in power since the 1932 revolution. Thaksin used his
position to reallocate positions of power within the government by promoting friends and
family that were loyal to him and his party, while displacing those that were not.
As for the King, he “appeared to personally dislike the arrogant Thaksin.”173 He
made statements that openly criticized Thaksin and his party. In addition to the attack on
the power of the bureaucratic elite, which the King relied on to protect the interests of the
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throne, Thaksin had tread on another significant source of the King’s support, the rural
masses. Kevin Hewison states in his article “Thai-Style Democracy” that:
“The most significant political contest was for the hearts and minds of the
masses. A central ideological component of the monarchy’s position is the
portrayal of the king as the champion of the poor..The palace has portrayed the
monarchy as the savior of the poor peasants, through notions of suffiecny and
palace charity. Thaksin offered a different approach to the same
constituency.”174

The appeal and power Thaksin had over the rural masses as result of his populist policies
posed a direct challenge to what had previously belonged to the King. This fear was
heightened as Thaksin coasted to another sweeping victory in 2005. While many had
begun to withdraw their support from Thaksin, it was clear the rural masses still
supported him.
The sale of Shin Corporation
A diverse opposition was gathering against Thaksin. The anti-Thaksin
movement was given cause to rally against him when he sold the Shin Corporation in
January 2006. “The Shinawatra family sold 49.61% of its shares to Temasek Holdings, a
Singapore government investment company, for 73.3 billion baht, (US $ 1.7 billion).”175
Large-scale protests began when people found out the Thaksin family had paid no tax on
the sale. In addition, just days before the sale was completed, the telecommunications
law had been changed to allow foreign ownership to extend from 25 to 49 percent,
allowing Thaksin’s family to sell more of their shares. Demonstrations began as a result.
There was considerable “middle class moral outrage” as many people saw this act as
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representative of the “nepotism and cronyism of the Thaksin administration.”176 Middle
class led NGO’s became the main orchestrators of the demonstrations against Thaksin.
As the demonstrations drew large numbers, an opposition party was formed,
identified as the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD). They charged Thaksin with
corruption and called for new “free and fair” elections. The old bureaucratic elite joined
the movement as well, but by appealing more to nationalist sentiments and arguing that
Thaksin was disrespectful to the monarchy, and thus a threat to the nation as a whole.
Conditioned by decades, People began to call on the monarch to intervene and “save” the
country from this immoral and corrupt figure.
Thaksin, seeing his power slipping, called for a new election in April 2006.
Elections were held, but the PAD boycotted, allowing TRT to coast to an easy victory. It
was at this point that King Bhumibol stepped in and declared that the elections were
undemocratic due to allegations of electoral fraud. He decided to send the issue to the
judiciary for judgments, annulled the results of the elections, and rescheduled new
elections for September 2006.177
September 2006
The King’s actions had potent ramifications. It became very clear that the palace
wanted Thaksin out of power, and so it would only be a matter of time before a coup took
place. Therefore, “the anti-Thaksin campaign then became a struggle for control of the
military,” as their support would be instrumental in implementing a coup.178 As a result,
people who had formally been political enemies came together in their mutual opposition
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to Thaksin. The wariness of military involvement that had been present since the 1976
coup broke down.
On September 19, 2006, with the consent of the king, a military group led by
General Sonthi imposed a coup against the Thaksin regime. The junta named itself the
“Administrative Reform Group under the Democratic system with the King as the Head
of State.”179 In article titled “Thailand: Military Coup 2006,” the Asian Human Rights
Commission outlined the following actions of the military upon seizing power: “Within
hours of taking power, the army abrogated the constitution, banned political assemblies,
commenced extralegal arrests, and authorized censorship.”180 The new leaders organized
a Council for Democratic Reform that issued a statement explaining their reasons for the
coup and stating that they would return the government to democratic rule in one year. In
addition, there would be an investigation into the suspect activities of TRT during the
previously annulled election.
Aftermath and Consequences
As we have seen, coups have been an important element in Thai politics. Many
people have supported them and seen them as a means to restore government on its
rightful path towards democracy. They believe that if the intentions of the coup are for
the good of the people and nation, than the coup can be justified, despite its inconsistency
with a truly democratic process. It cannot be doubted that the monarchy, too, has had a
role in these events and this thinking.
Such was the mindset of the majority of Thai’s towards the 2006 coup. To many,
it seemed apparent that Thaksin was no better, if not worse, than the previous corrupt
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self-seeking politicians. “The Thaksin government was a civilian autocracy. It did not
respect human right, the rule of law or democratic principles. It manipulated the media,
intimidated its opponents, and played with legislation and public institution for its own
advantage.”181 There is no denying the undemocratic nature of the Thaksin regime. But
the ramifications of the coup were not limited to the removal of this particular person
from office. The consequences really like are in regards to the motives of the coup, the
constitution of 1997, and the general uncertainty of the democratic future in Thailand.
The motives behind the coup highlight the sentiments of the bureaucratic elite.
Thaksin’s reign posed a threat to the old bureaucratic elite and to traditional sources of
power. Because of this, he was a threat to the support base of the King, including the
King’s position as champion of the poor. It was really for these reasons, and not because
he was a corrupt politician, that actions were seen as necessary to remove him from
office. The understanding that the bureaucratic elite would outwardly support democratic
growth, but not if it came at the risk of a direct challenge to their power, was
demonstrated by the 2006 coup.
The constitution of 1997 was the most important in Thai history. It was the first
real attempt to move power away from the traditional bureaucratic elite and give it to “the
people.” It was not just that institutional changes that took place with it, but that this
constitution “marked a great advance in the thinking of people in Thailand on
constitutional issues and the management of their society.”182. When the military took
over in 2006 and removed the first popularly elected prime minister in Thai history, and
then dissolved the constitution that mandated it, it was a serious setback for the
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democratic movement. The work and effort that had gone into initiating these reforms
and changes, beginning with the events of 1992, had now been erased. The political
ramifications were clear with the new constitution written in the aftermath of the 2006
coup, shifting some of the power back to the bureaucratic elite. But the psychological
consequences felt in society were perhaps the most damaging part of the 2006 coup.
They future of their democratic growth was now uncertain as ever. And the monarchy,
while beloved by the people, had a clear role in the setback.

VII.

CONCLUSION

This concluding chapter will proceed in the following manner. First, I will
analyze the three “key event” chapters in terms of the King’s actions. Second, I will
discuss the consequences of his actions in regard to how they affected the democratic
transition process. Third, I will consider Huntington’s theories in connection with the
role of the king in Thailand. Lastly, I will offer my predictions for the future of
democracy in Thailand.
Events of 1973-76, 1992, and 2006.
The events of 1973-76, 1992, and 2006 provide unmistakable evidence of the
direct role the King plays in Thai politics. They also underscore the motives behind the
King’s actions in each case - that is his conservative mentality and long-lasting
relationship with the military, and not his supposed support for democratic reform.
The actions of the King during 1973 and 1976 on the surface seem contradictory.
In one example, he sided “with democracy,” and in the other he acted against it. In 1992,
he stepped in again, this time ostensibly in favor of democracy. In 2006, he supported a
coup that deposed a “corrupt and immoral” politician. On the surface some would argue
this is an undemocratic action, but many thought of the coup as positive and necessary for
democracy in that it was essential to rid the government of a corrupt ruler and set
Thailand on the path back towards democracy. I contend these were not actions taken to
further democracy. Rather, the King’s actions are explained more by his conservatism.
Conservatism stresses the perseveration of the old order that embodies the traditional
values and customs of Thailand, as well as the importance of stability and unity above all

other things. In all of these circumstances, conditions of upset were threatening the
stability of Thailand, as well as challenging the security of the “old order.”
The King’s intervention in 1973 was in response to mass protests that resulted in
violence. In 1976, the radicalization of the student movement became a destabilizing
force to society. In 1992 social tension had risen in the form of mass protest that resulted
in violence once again. The year 2006 presented a similar situation, with rising social
tension due to popular dissatisfaction with the regime of Thaksin. Consistent with the
King’s conservative objectives, the purpose of his intervention in all of these
circumstances was to restore stability and unity to society, not necessarily to further
democratic reforms.
The second critical element in evaluating all these events is the King’s
relationship with the military. The King and the military enjoy a “symbiotic relationship”
in Thailand.183 They rely on one another to further their own objectives. The military
needs (at least tacitly) the support of the King in their political objectives. The King
needs the military to protect “the continuity of the throne” and “national security.”184 In
the event that a threat is posed to either of these things, the King will support the military
to intervene on his behalf.
I recognize it is fair to say, as is shown by the events of 1973 and 1992, that the
King will sometimes side against the military. The reason for this is due to concern for
the debilitating effect military rule would have on society at that time. If his ultimate
goal of stability and unity come at the cost of siding against the military, then he has done
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so. But this is not necessarily to encourage full democracy at the expense of the military
in its place.
The relationship between the King and the military is reflected in the key events
of 1976, 1991 and 2006. In 1976, the radical student movement was challenging the “old
order” and “traditional” values of Thailand. In 1991, corrupt politicians were
destabilizing the functionality of government, which resulted in social turmoil that
threatened national security. In 2006, Thaksin challenged the old order and the values
embodied in the traditional elite. The King supported the military at times in these events
to protect the national interest, to protect these traditional values, and to restore or
maintain the continued influence of the throne.
Consequences of actions
While the King’s actions were guided by his sense of conservatism and his
relationship with the military, they were also guided by his sense of divine right. The
King sees himself as the father of the country, and therefore believes that he alone knows
what is best for the people in the end. Many in the populace also see his role from this
perspective. In addition, because the institution of the monarchy has always been the
unifying symbol of Thai society, the King believes he must carry on the tradition of
upholding the values, customs and traditions that are so central to Thai life. From this
perspective, the presence of the king in Thai politics is crucial, in that he provides
political stability. As Hewison writes, “The King and the People become one. The
Throne and the Nation become one, and a profound meaning is thus given to the Throne.
It becomes the personification of Thai nationhood, the symbol of the Nation’s unity and

independence, the invariable constant above the inconsistencies of politics.” 185 The
King’s continued presence in politics is therefore seen not only appropriate, but is also
expected and necessary. This role he plays in Thai society is another justification for his
interventionist behavior.
It would be extreme of course to say that the King’s interventions are always
negative. My argument is that his interventionist behavior as a pattern is detrimental to
the growth of democracy in the long run. It can be helpful in specific situations. For
example, in 1973 and 1991, the King did represent and respond to the requests of his
people. In answer to their protests, he protected their interests and sided against the
military. No other figure could have done this in Thailand at that time, and the popular
protests were not going to overcome the military.
This was especially the case in 1973 when the military was all-powerful and had
been ruling for many years. Despite the initial revolution in 1932, the democratic
transition had really progressed very little. There were no representative institutions that
could channel the needs of the people, let alone bring about any dramatic change.
Whatever his intentions or motivations, at this point in time the King did help the
democratic process. However, with the coup in 1976, only three years later this success
was short lived.
In 1991 a similar situation unfolded. It is true that circumstances were much
different at this time. The military was less powerful and had taken a back seat
politically since the civilian government had been in place. In addition, the people had
developed a greater political consciousness due to the rise of a new middle class and
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increase in wealth and education. These were not just radical students protesting- it was a
significant and respectable portion of the Thai population. One would say that these
circumstances gave more democratic hope to the situation than the circumstances of
1973.
Despite the liberalization that had taken place, democratic institutions were still
struggling. The violent response by the military to the 1992 protests signified the need
for an intervention. The King again played an important role in this situation, standing
up for the people, when there was no one else that could do so. But that did not mean
that democracy was at hand or that democracy was the King’s goal
2006 offers a much different situation. By this time Thailand had produced the
first “peoples’ constitutions,” and had held, voted and successfully placed in office the
first popularly elected government. In the constitution was the creation of new
institutions of accountability to increase transparency in the government and to decrease
corruption. While these democratic institutions were far from perfect, they were
important because they reflected the desire of the people for a truly representative
government.
Due to these circumstances, the intervention by the King and the support of the
2006 coup is a contentious issue. The argument that his intervention was “in the interest
of the people” or “for the sake of democracy” does not stand the same way it arguably
did in the 1973 and 1992 conflicts.
First and foremost, while there was massive opposition to Thaksin, there were still
many who supported him. It would certainty not be in their interest to have him
removed. Second, while it appears rue that Thaksin was a corrupt and authoritative

ruler, the justification for the coup, which was to restore Thailand on the rightful path to
democracy, does not hold because he was removed via undemocratic means. In addition,
the democratic institutions created by the 1997 constitution were all dissolved. This
would not strengthen democracy nor does it represent the people’s interest.
I believe an important reason these interventions do not contribute to the overall
growth of democracy is because the King’s aim in the end is not to further democracy.
He intervenes only in times of crises, and when he does, it is to restore the status quo,
whatever that may be. While in the aftermath there was some progress, it was only a
matter of time before undemocratic actions resumed. The King’s political agenda is
shaped by the sentiment that what is good and necessary for the country foremost is the
survival of the monarchy, because only the King can truly act in the people’s interest in
critical moments. The King points to these times of crises as examples of why this
sentiment is true.
Indeed, I argue it is the absence of stronger democratic institutions that is the
reason for these interventions. And while this was understandable in the early stages of
the transition before these institutions had time to grow, there comes a point where it is
no longer acceptable. The continuation of the King’s interventionist behavior prevents
democratic institutions from truly evolving and so the people continue to rely on him.
Theories Revisited- Transformation and the Role of the Monarchy
Transformation
Under Huntington’s theory of transition, Thailand’s democratic transition is
considered a transformation because the transition was initiated by the regime that was in
power at that time. Consistent with Huntington’s theory, the reformers within the regime

initiated the transition. At the time there was little existence of organized opposition. In
addition, while there were “standpatters” in the regime, mostly in the royal family, they
had lost much of their political power and popular support. The reformers did not meet
much resistance from either party. These conditions allowed for the transition to be
initiated in Thailand with relative ease.
The reformers were members of the bureaucratic elite and the military. They
advocated for a change from the absolute monarchy to a constitutional monarchy. Their
desire for political change resulted from problems in society that had been created due to
modernizing changes. These changes put pressure on the political system of the absolute
monarchy. The government was unable to address or solves these tensions and problems,
and as a result popular dissatisfaction grew, and doubt was cast on their ability to govern.
This situation called for the need to reform.
For quite some time the transition was halted, as the military reformers
consolidated power for themselves in the time period from 1933-1956. Eventually the
process began again. It was in this period that Huntington’s theory of “backward
legitimacy” was implemented. As was evidenced in the “history of the king’s” chapter,
the monarchy was the traditional source of legitimacy in society, and therefore played the
role of initiating and directing change. Sarit resurrected this source of legitimacy for
Bhumibol, and used it to legitimize the current democratic process. The transition would
move forward, but only with the consent of the King as the legitimizing force.
Democratic reform was thus tied inexorably with the King and his actions and
motivations. It was through this method that the standpatters could be appeased, and the
reformers in the regime could maintain some level of control over the process.

The Role of the Monarchy in Transformation
Using the King as a source of legitimacy to further the democratic transition can
work, but only up to a point. As with the problem of interventionist behavior, the success
of the transition necessitates the King’s involvement in the beginning, but then
democratic institutions and practices much be allowed to evolve and take hold. In order
for democracy to succeed, the King must transfer his source of traditional legitimacy over
to these institutions. This has not happened. I maintain the role and actions of the King
have prevented real democracy from being able to grow and mature, due to his continued
hold over traditional legitimacy and authority.
The Future
“The future of existing traditional monarchies is bleak.”186 This is the situation
the institution of the monarchy in Thailand must face. The current King has reigned for
64 years. It seems that kind of change in regards to the monarchy’s position in Thailand
will not take place before he dies. However, because the institution of the monarchy has
become so personalized to him due to the longevity of his reign, it is possible his death
many bring about real changes.
If the democratic transition is to proceed to maturity, it is inevitable that the
monarchy must hand over the traditional, ultimate source of authority. As British scholar
Vernon wrote, “Constitutional monarchy” is a “contradiction in terms, because, by
definition, monarchy is an absolutist system of government.”187 Constitutional
monarchies work in other countries because there the monarchy has given up his
traditional source of legitimacy. The democratic transition in Thailand will continue to
186
187

Huntington, p. 191
Handley, p. 46

suffer until this full transfer of power takes place and society can turn away from the
King as the institution of ultimate resort.
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